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Notes
BRASCHI v. STAHL ASSOCIATES CO.:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1989 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that, as a matter
of law, Miguel Braschi could be considered a family member of Braschi's
long-term homosexual lover Leslie Blanchard.' The Court of Appeals,
in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., concluded that, in addition to the tradi-
tional view of family as those related by blood, marriage or adoption, "a
more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized
by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." 2
Legal experts predict that the Braschi decision will have far-reaching ef-
fects.3 Braschi is significant in that it is the first opinion by a highest state
court conferring legal recognition on gay and lesbian relationships in
the form of family member status.4 Whether the decision will have the
far-reaching effects and implications predicted by legal commentators
remains to be seen.
This Note will explore the current legal status of same-sex relation-
ships 5 and examine the impact of that status on the rights of same-sex
couples. 6 This Note will then analyze the protection traditionally af-
forded nuclear families under the United Stateq Constitution and dis-
1. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 214, 543 N.E.2d 49, 55, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 790 (1989). Braschi sought protection from eviction from
Blanchard's rent-controlled apartment under 9 New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations § 2204.6(d), N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAw (McKinney 1987). This regula-
tion provides that a landlord may not dispossess a "family member" of a de-
ceased tenant who has been living with the tenant in a rent-controlled
apartment. For the full text of § 2204.6(d), see infra note 54.
2. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89.
3. See, e.g., Anderson, New Nuclear Family, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 20. The
chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on the Rights of Gay
People asserts that the decision "signals the onset of a new direction in family
law." Id. William Rubenstein, the American Civil Liberties Union attorney who
argued the case on behalf of Braschi, considers the case "a groundbreaking vic-
tory for lesbian[s] and gay men ... the most important single step forward in
American law toward legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships." Chi.
Daily L. Bull., July 6, 1989, at 1, col. 5, 14, col. 3.
4. Anderson, supra note 3, at 20. The opinion will also apply to unmarried,
heterosexual couples involved in long-term interdependent relationships. Id.
5. Throughout this Note, the term "same-sex relationship" will be used to
denote both gay and lesbian relationships. For a discussion of the current legal
status of same-sex relationships, see infra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
(361)
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cuss the impact of this constitutional protection on state regulation of
domestic relations. 7 Next, this Note will trace the evolution of an ex-
panded notion of family in the context of protection from eviction in the
New York state courts culminating in the Braschi decision.8 Finally, this
Note will discuss the reasons why the Braschi opinion, although a signifi-
cant victory for same-sex couples, will have limited precedential effect
outside of the context of protection from eviction under New York
City's Rent and Eviction Regulations. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Limbo of Same-Sex Relationships
In most jurisdictions same-sex couples exist in a legal limbo, in-
volved in a relationship that has no legal classification and, therefore, no
concomitant legal rights or obligations.' 0 For example, courts have
consistently refused to recognize a right to enter into a same-sex mar-
riage." Challenges to this marital prohibition have failed when based
7. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 51-124 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties
Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 398 (1986) (discussing legal system's "failure
to accommodate reality" in area of gay rights). An exception to this lack of legal
recognition is the so-called "domestic partnership" type of ordinance adopted
by some cities. Certain cities, acting in their capacities as employers, have ex-
tended to unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual and homosexual couples the
same employee benefits accorded to married couples. Berkeley, California was
the first city to adopt such a policy in March 1985. See id. at 372 n.631; see also H.
CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 63 (4th
ed. 1986).
Berkeley's policy stipulates that any insurance company chosen by the city
to provide coverage to city employees should extend coverage to any employee's
"domestic partner." Id. A city worker seeking coverage for his or her domestic
partner must file an affidavit attesting that the partners are not married, that
they share the common necessities of life and that each is responsible for the
common welfare of both partners. Rivera, supra, at 372 n.631.
Unfortunately, the Berkeley policy seems to have had little practical impact
on the rights of city employees. H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra, at 63. With the
exception of insurers providing dental insurance coverage to city employees, no
health insurance carrier for the city of Berkeley has been willing to extend cover-
age to domestic partners. Id.
For a discussion of the implementation of domestic partnership legislation
in other cities, see Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits
Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-2
(1986).
11. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (mar-
riage of two males to achieve immigration status invalid under state law and
Immigration and Nationality Act), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1111 (1982). Although many state statutes concerning marriage do not
define the term "marriage" or specify the sex of the participants, courts have
uniformly held that the term, as used in such statutes, refers to the union of a
man and a woman. See id. at 1122 ("[T]he term 'marriage' as used throughout
[Vol. 35: p. 361
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on either the fundamental right to marry assured by the United States
Constitution' 2 or on an equal rights amendment to a state constitu-
tion. 13 Additionally, in many states, the recognition of a right to same-
sex marriage would conflict with state laws that criminalize consensual
sodomy. 14
Same-sex couples seeking to establish a family relationship have oc-
casionally resorted to adoption as a means of defining their respective
Colorado law refers to a contract and ceremony involving . . . 'a man and a
woman.' "); see also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (two wo-
men prevented from marrying under state statutes because proposed relation-
ship not marriage as term is commonly defined); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 311, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971) (state statute governing marriage con-
templates state of union between persons of opposite sex, thus prohibiting mar-
riage of two men), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (mar-
riage between man and transvestite invalid because marriage must be contract
between "man and woman").
12. The United States Supreme Court has found that heterosexual mar-
riage is a fundamental right entitled to protection from unwarranted state inter-
ference under the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th
amendment. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978) (striking
down statute requiring residents with child support obligations to obtain court
permission to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (ban on interra-
cial marriages violates 14th amendment); see also Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590 (no
constitutional protection of right of marriage between persons of same sex);
Baker, 291 Minn. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (prohibition of same-sex marriage
does not offend 1st, 8th, 9th or 14th amendments to U.S. Constitution).
For a further discussion of due process protection in the areas of marriage
and family, see infra note 38 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion
of the constitutional right to marry, see Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Mar-
riage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463, 507-11 (1983). For a discussion of constitutional arguments
in favor of the recognition of a right of same-sex marriage, see Friedman, The
Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and
Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134 (1987-88); Ingram, A
Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry
George--or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 44-50 (1984).
13. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974)
(equal rights amendment to state constitution does not require state to author-
ize same-sex marriage).
14. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 136 n.13. This conflict rests on the
traditional assumption that a marriage necessarily involves sexual relations be-
tween the partners. Id. In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a state law that criminalized consensual sodomy, concluding that the right to
privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the 14th amendment does not
extend to homosexual consensual sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986); see also Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S.
901 (1976), aff'g without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (no constitu-
tional bar to criminalization of homosexual sodomy). Consensual sodomy re-
mains a crime in roughly half the states. See Recent Development, Protecting the
Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Crises, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220, 225
n.35 (1989). For a listing of state statutes prohibiting private, consensual, adult
homosexual acts, see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homo-
sexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949-51 (1979).
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rights and obligations in the relationship.' 5 In jurisdictions that allow
it, 16 adoption of one member of a same-sex couple by the other can be a
convenient means of establishing a pseudo-marital relationship. 17
Adoption can serve a second purpose for same-sex couples as a public
acknowledgment of their emotional bond.18
Another method available to same-sex couples for defining the legal
aspects of their relationship is the cohabitation contract. 19 The validity
of such a contract between cohabiting, heterosexual couples was estab-
15. For a discussion of the use of adult adoption by same-sex couples, see
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw § 1.05[2][a]-[g] (R. Achtenberg ed. 1989)
[hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION]; Comment, Adult Adoption: A "New" Legal Tool
for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 667 (1984).
16. Adoption is a statutory, rather than a common law, right. See Comment,
supra note 15, at 689. Therefore, same-sex couples seeking to utilize adult adop-
tion as a means of establishing a legally recognized relationship must look to the
applicable state statute to determine if such an adoption is feasible. Id. at 688.
Even if a same-sex couple has met the statutory requirements, however, their
adoption petition may be denied by the court through the exercise of judicial
discretion. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 471
N.E.2d 424, 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652, 655 (1984) (disallowing adoption of one
member of same-sex couple by other as contrary to public policy and legislative
intent under state's domestic relations law); see also Comment, supra note 15, at
669 (discussion of view that courts are gatekeepers of public morality obligated
to disallow adoptions which are against public policy or legislative intent).
Courts that have disallowed adult adoptions on discretionary grounds have
pointed out that the primary legislative intent behind adoption statutes is to cre-
ate a parent-child relationship to which sexual intimacy is repugnant. See, e.g.,
Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d at 236, 471 N.E.2d at 425, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653; see also
Comment, supra note 15, at 668-69 & n.10. Other courts, however, have recog-
nized that adult adoption is functionally dissimilar to the adoption of children
and requires different criteria and considerations. See id. (citing In re Adoption
of Miller, 227 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ("A minor receives the
special attention and solicitude of the court .... Child custody, welfare, environ-
ment and support are important matters which the court must decide for the
child .... However, adults are cut loose to make such decisions for themselves
... to exercise a wide discretion as to their legal status.")).
17. The legal relationship created by adoption is that of parent and child.
See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 15, § 1.05[1]. Such a relationship, however,
carries with it many of the same rights and benefits established by marriage.
Such rights include the right of inheritance under intestacy laws, legal status as
next of kin with the power to make decisions on behalf of the other partner in
emergency situations, rights to insurance and employment benefits and the right
to live together in housing accommodations restricted to related individuals. See
id. § 1.05[2][a]-[g]; Comment, supra note 15, at 679-88.
18. See In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 32, 452 N.YS.2d 198, 200
(1982) (upholding adoption of 43-year-old man by 32-year-old gay partner for
purposes of public acknowledgment of emotional bond as well as unification of
property rights).
19. For a discussion and examples of same-sex cohabitation contracts, see
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 15, §§ 2.04-.05[3][m][iii] & apps. A cohabita-
tion contract formalizes the cohabiting partners' respective obligations within
the relationship. It must contain the standard elements of a contract, such as a
meeting of the minds and valid consideration. Id. § 2.04[1].
364 [Vol. 35: p. 361
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lished in the infamous case of Marvin v. Marvin.20 The Marvin court
based its reasoning on the principle that adults who voluntarily live to-
gether and engage in sexual relations are fully competent to make con-
tractual arrangements regarding their respective earnings and property
rights.2 ' This reasoning has been applied to similar cases involving
same-sex couples. 22 A written cohabitation agreement between a same-
20. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684-85, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831-
32 (1976). In Marvin the female partner of a cohabiting heterosexual couple
brought suit to enforce an alleged oral contract entitling her to certain property
and support payments upon dissolution of the relationship. Id. at 666, 557 P.2d
at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The California Supreme Court held that she had
stated a valid cause of action for support on the possible theories of express
contract, implied contract, quantum meruit, implied partnership or constructive
trust. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. For a general
discussion of the Marvin case, see Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples: Toward
a New Definition of Family, 26J. FAM. L. 357, 364-67 (1987-88).
21. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. The
court also noted the prevalence and social acceptance of nonmarital relation-
ships in modem society. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
Courts generally will enforce provisions in cohabitation agreements concerning
financial matters such as support. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 15,
§ 2.04[2]. A legal handbook designed for lesbians and gay men, however, cau-
tions that it is prudent to omit any reference to sexual relations in cohabitation
contracts. Id. § 2.04[1]. A court may refuse to enforce the entire contract where
sexual relations form all or part of the consideration. Id.; see also Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d at 672, 557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823 ("[A] contract between
nonmarital partners, even if expressly made in contemplation of a common liv-
ing arrangement, is invalid . . . if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the
consideration for the agreement."). This is a particularly relevant risk for same-
sex couples in those states which criminalize homosexual activity. SEXUAL ORI-
ENTATION, supra note 15, § 2.04[1].
Some courts will, if possible, sever those portions of a cohabitation contract
resting upon sexual consideration and enforce any remaining provisions sup-
ported by independent, non-sexual consideration. See Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 672,
557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823 ("[A]ny severable portion of the contract
supported by independent consideration will still be enforced."); Whorton v.
Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 451, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (1988) (citing
Marvin). As not all courts are willing to sever such provisions, same-sex couples
should be careful to set out adequate, non-sexual consideration to ensure that
the entire contract will be enforceable by a court. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra
note 15, § 2.04[1]. Provisions dealing with personal matters such as housekeep-
ing, companionship and fidelity generally are not judicially enforceable. Id.
§ 2.04[2]. Such provisions may muddy the contractual waters, providing a court
with an excuse not to enforce an entire contract on the ground of lack of valid
consideration. Id.
22. See, e.g., Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (reversing
trial court's dismissal of claim for support and property rights based on oral
cohabitation agreement between two homosexual men); Friedlander v. Solari
(N.Y. App. Term.), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1988, at 14, col. 4 (denying motion for
summary judgment in action to enforce oral cohabitation agreement between
two women where present financial support was provided in return for claim on
partner's future trust fund). At least one commentator is of the opinion that the
Marvin decision was made possible in part by California's Brown Act which
decriminalized adulterous cohabitation and sodomy and oral copulation be-
tween consenting adults. See Note, supra note 20, at 365. Although homosexual
5
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sex couple may serve as proof of the existence and duration of the rela-
tionship in much the same way as a marriage license would for a hetero-
sexual couple. Neither an oral nor written cohabitation contract,
however, can confer upon the partners of a same-sex couple all of the
automatic rights and privileges accorded a heterosexual couple upon the
event of their marriage. 23
B. The Impact of the Lack of Legal Recognition on the
Rights of Same-Sex Couples
Because no legally recognized spousal or family relationship exists
between same-sex partners, individuals involved in such a relationship
generally have not been extended the rights and privileges traditionally
accorded to members of nuclear families.2 4 The statutory right to pro-
tection from eviction from a rent-controlled apartment at issue in Braschi
is only one of a host of benefits extended to spouses and other family
members by custom, by statute and under common law. 25 Rights typi-
cally extended by law solely to family members include, among others,
financial support upon dissolution of a relationship, 26 the opportunity
activity remains a crime in approximately half the states, see supra note 14, one
commentator has stated that an express, written same-sex cohabitation agree-
ment concerning property rights should be given effect by the courts of all states
provided it is properly drafted and based on valid, adequate consideration. SEX-
UAL ORIENTATION, supra note 15, § 2.04[l].
23. Like a cohabitation agreement, heterosexual marriage is itself a con-
tract. See 52 AM.JUR. 2D Marriage § 4 (1970) ("Marriage is contractual in nature,
and a valid marriage is a binding contract."); 55 CJ.S. Marriage § 1(b) (1948)
(marriage generally considered civil contract). Marriage, however, is also a legal
status leading to the grant of certain rights and privileges by the state and third
parties. See L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT at xv-xix (1981). For a dis-
cussion of some of the rights and privileges automatically ascribed to spouses
upon the advent of marriage, see infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
Rights extended to family members by third parties such as a landlord, an em-
ployer or the state by their very nature cannot be provided for in a private co-
habitation agreement. Because such third parties are not parties to the
cohabitation contract, they are not bound by it to provide benefits to same-sex
or heterosexual partners.
24. A nuclear family is generally recognized as consisting of a married, het-
erosexual couple and their unmarried, dependent children. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1547 (1986) (defining "nuclear family"
as "a family group consisting of father, mother, and children"). For a discussion
of rights normally restricted to spouses and family members, see infra notes 25-
32 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the statutory right at issue in Braschi, see infra notes
51-56 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (providing
for alimony only upon entry of divorce decree). In some jurisdictions, however,
same-sex couples can provide for such financial support through use of a cohabi-
tation contract. See, e.g., Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982)
(affirming award of temporary financial support to female partner of cohabiting
heterosexual couple pending disposition of suit brought to enforce alleged oral
366 [Vol. 35: p. 361
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to inherit through intestacy laws,2 7 status as next-of-kin with the power
to make emergency medical decisions and funeral arrangements, 28 ben-
efits under entitlement programs such as welfare, Social Security and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 29 and the right to recover
damages for loss of consortium3 0 and infliction of emotional distress
3 1
upon the death or injury of the partner or other family member.
Additional benefits extended by custom solely to family members
include hospital visitation rights, benefits received through the employ-
ment of a family member such as health insurance and survivorship ben-
efits under pensions, as well as benefits from various other types of
organizations such as museums, health clubs and vacation resorts which
often offer low cost family rates. 32 Thus, by leading to the denial of
these and other rights, the lack of legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships has a severe detrimental impact on the lives of participants in such
relationships.
cohabitation agreement). For a discussion of cohabitation contracts, see supra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1987) (intestate share of sur-
viving spouse). For a discussion of the impact of probate and tax codes on the
inheritance of property within non-traditional families, see Lovas, When is a Fam-
ily Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non- Traditional
Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353 (1987-88).
28. Recent Development, supra note 14, at 224. For a discussion of meth-
ods by which participants in a same-sex relationship can ensure such rights for
their partners, see id. at 229-35 (discussing durable powers of attorney, living
wills, wills and written instructions regarding desired funeral arrangements). In
heterosexual couples, such rights are gained automatically upon the advent of
marriage. See id. at 223-24.
29. Cox, supra note 10, at 2-3. For a discussion of the legal ability of heter-
osexual cohabitants to obtain these benefits, see Blumberg, Cohabitation Without
Marriage: A Diferent Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1137-59 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Gunter v. Marine Offshore Catering Co., 617 F. Supp. 1018,
1020 (W.D. La. 1985) (general maritime law disallows cause of action for loss of
consortium where injury to heterosexual partner occurred prior to marriage);
Curry v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 577 F. Supp. 991, 993-94 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (dis-
allowing cause of action for loss of consortium where plaintiffs not legally mar-
ried to each other); Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 279, 758 P.2d 582, 590,
250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1988) (denying recovery for loss of consortium to male
plaintiff for death of unmarried female cohabitant in automobile accident).
31. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 277, 758 P.2d 582, 588, 250
Cal. Rptr. 254, 260 (1988) (denying recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to male plaintiff who witnessed death of unmarried female cohabi-
tant in automobile accident); Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 1276-77,
237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877-78 (1987) (denying recovery for infliction of emotional
distress to homosexual man who witnessed verbal and physical abuse of "exclu-
sive life partner" by bus driver on ground that relationship not "close relation-
ship" required for claim).
32. See Cox, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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C. The Parameters of "Family"
1. The U.S. Supreme Court
Any consideration of the limitation of rights to spouses and other
family members necessarily raises the question of who is to be consid-
ered "family." Unlike the designation "spouse," which has a precise
legal meaning,3 3 "family" is a general term susceptible to many mean-
ings or interpretations depending upon the context in which it is used. 34
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
avoided defining family in any conclusive or comprehensive manner.3 5
The existence and nature of the Court's definition of family is of
critical importance to those involved in same-sex relationships.
Although domestic relations have traditionally been considered a state
concern, the states' power to regulate domestic relations has always
been subject to constitutional limitations. 36 The Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of the constitutional validity of state regulation of do-
mestic relations.
3 7
The Supreme Court has extended broad constitutional protection
from undue governmental interference to family relationships under the
33. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1258 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "spouse" as
"one's wife or husband"); see also Menchaca v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 59 Cal. App.
3d 117, 127-28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 607, 613-14 (1976) (unmarried female cohabitant
of insured male not covered under policy covering "spouse" of insured, as
"spouse" is lawful wife or husband according to legal as well as ordinary mean-
ing of term).
34. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Turner, 29 Ohio App. 3d 73,
74, 503 N.E.2d 212, 215 (1986) (meaning of word "family" depends on field of
law in which word used, purpose to be accomplished by use and facts and cir-
cumstances of case).
35. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1271 (1980) [hereinafter Developments]. One commentator, however,
is of the opinion that the Court, in its approximately 50 decisions discussing
family interests, has effectively defined family as those related by blood, mar-
riage or adoption. See Hafen, supra note 12, at 491-92.
36. Developments, supra note 35, at 1159 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1967) (state statutes prohibiting mixed-race marriages unconstitutional
under 14th amendment to United States Constitution); Atherton v. Atherton,
181 U.S. 155 (1901) (full faith and credit clause required New York court to give
effect to divorce decree previously granted by Kentucky court)).
37. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishing
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in cases arising
under United States Constitution).
[Vol. 35: p. 361
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doctrine of substantive due process.3 8 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 9
a plurality of the Court utilized the substantive due process doctrine to
strike down a city housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwell-
ing unit to members of a single "family." '40 Although the right to live as
an extended family unit is not explicitly granted in the text of the Con-
stitution, the Court placed nuclear and extended families squarely
within its due process protection. 4 1 In accordance with this protection,
the Court found "the usual judicial deference" toward intrusive govern-
mental regulation "inappropriate." 42 The Court applied a somewhat
higher standard of review "examinling] carefully the importance of the
38. The doctrine of substantive due process stems from the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution, which provide that no
federal or state governments, respectively, shall deprive any person of "life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV,
§ 1. The due process clauses are recognized as authorizing judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy of legal procedure under federal and state law. See Developments,
supra note 35, at 1166. Substantive due process, on the other hand, is concerned
with limiting governmental deprivations of certain fundamental rights regard-
less of the adequacy of the procedures employed. Id. Substantive due process
protection is afforded by applying a heightened standard of judicial review to
federal or state laws that limit the exercise of certain fundamental rights. J.
NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTIUTIONAL LAw 351 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter NOWACK]. The usual standard of review used by the Court when
scrutinizing the substance of state or federal law is the rational basis or rational
relationship test. Under this standard, the government must establish that the
legislation in question is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Id. at 357. When state or federal legislation or regulations impinge on funda-
mental personal rights protected by the Constitution, however, strict scrutiny is
applied. Id. at 351. The legislation or regulation will be upheld only if it is
narrowly tailored to protect a substantial or compelling state interest. Id. This
heightened standard of review clearly extends to rights expressly granted by the
Constitution. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639 (1943) ("[F]reedoms of speech and of press ... are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect."). A heightened standard of review has also been applied to
legislation restricting conduct in the areas of marriage and family which are not
expressly protected in the text of the Constitution. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to marital relationship);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (applying heightened
scrutiny to state legislation of family living arrangements).
39. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
40. Id. at 506. The ordinance defined family as the husband, wife, unmar-
ried children with no children of their own living with them, father or mother of
the nominal head of the household. Id. at 496 & n.2. The appellant, who lived
in her home together with her son and two grandsons (who were cousins rather
than brothers), was convicted of a criminal violation of the ordinance. Id.
41. Id. at 503-06. Justice Powell expressed the plurality's view as follows:
"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution." Id. at 502 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
42. Id. at 499. By "usual judicial deference" the Court appears to be refer-
ring to the rational basis standard of review. For a discussion of this standard,
see supra note 38.
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governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation."'43
In extending constitutional protection to nuclear and extended
family relationships, the Moore Court relied upon the historical impor-
tance of those relationships in this country. 4 4 Because same-sex rela-
tionships, although having attributes and functions similar to the
traditional forms of family,4 5 lack this historical importance, it is impos-
sible to predict whether such relationships will be accorded similar con-
stitutional protection. 4 6 To date, the Court has not clearly extended
constitutional protection to any non-traditional "family" relationship.
4 7
43. Id. This higher standard falls somewhat short of the strict scrutiny ac-
corded governmental intrusions on rights specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution. The Moore Court did not invoke the usual "substantial and compelling
state interest" language of the strict scrutiny standard of review. For a discus-
sion of the strict scrutiny standard, see supra note 38. The challenged ordinance
failed to survive the Court's heightened scrutiny because it was not sufficiently
related to the interests that the city claimed justified the ordinance: the minimal-
ization of traffic and parking congestion and the avoidance of an undue financial
burden on the city school system. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500.
44. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-06. Lacking a clear-cut textual basis for exten-
sion of constitutional protection to the family, Justice Powell turned to the func-
tion the institution of family has served in the nation's history and tradition:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural.
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally de-
serving of constitutional recognition.
Id. at 503-04 (footnotes omitted).
45. Commentators have suggested that by analyzing the opinions in Moore
and other family and marriage definition cases it is possible to discern five attrib-
utes which the Court considers the essence of a family relationship: (1) biologi-
cal relationship; (2) potential parent-child relationship; (3) cohabitation;
(4) permanence and formal commitment; and (5) emotional or psychological
support and involvement. See Developments, supra note 35, at 1280-83. For a dis-
cussion of how these attributes apply to alternative families, see Cox, supra note
10, at 8 n.28.
46. The Supreme Court has clearly placed homosexual conduct taking
place outside the context of any committed relationship beyond the Constitu-
tion's protection. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Bowers
Court relied in part on the long history of state proscription of homosexual sod-
omy to uphold a Georgia anti-sodomy statute: "Proscriptions against [homosex-
ual] conduct have ancient roots .... [T]o claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . . . is, at best,
facetious." Id. at 192-94. The Court pointed out that no connection between
homosexual activity and the recognized fundamental rights of family, marriage or
procreation had been demonstrated in the case before it. Id. at 191. Thus, the
Court evidently left open at least the possibility that a same-sex relationship hav-
ing attributes similar to family or marriage could be constitutionally protected.
47. Developments, supra note 35, at 1272.
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It has been suggested, however, that the Court has shown a willingness
to do so should the proper case arise. 4 8
2. One State's Emerging Definition of Family: New York's Rent-Controlled
Tenancy Succession Cases
a. Lower Court Cases
Any state has traditionally been free to decide, within constitutional
limits, which relationships it wishes to exclude from the benefits tradi-
tionally accorded to nuclear families." 9 The Supreme Court has clearly
extended constitutional protection only to families related by blood,
marriage or adoption. 50 Thus, the states appear to have wide latitude in
excluding alternative families, such as same-sex couples, from the pro-
tection of legislation intended to benefit families.
One example of such protective legislation is the New York City
rent control regulation at issue in Braschi. Section 2204.6(d) of the New
York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 5 was promulgated under the
authority of the New York state rent control statute.5 2 Section
2204.6(d) provides that upon the death of the named tenant 53 of a rent-
controlled apartment, the landlord may not dispossess the tenant's sur-
viving spouse or any member of the tenant's "family" who had been
living with the tenant. 54 Those qualifying for protection under this sec-
tion receive a new rent-controlled tenancy. 5 5 Not surprisingly, given the
fact that the term "family" is defined in neither the regulations nor the
rent control statute, there has been much litigation over exactly what
48. See id. at 1271. This conclusion is based on an analysis of Supreme
Court decisions concerning foster families and the relationship of unwed par-
ents to their illegitimate children. See id. at 1272-77.
49. For a discussion of state regulation of domestic relations, see supra note
36 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the benefits traditionally ac-
corded to nuclear families, see supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. 9 New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 2204.6(d), N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAW (McKinney 1987) (formerly § 56(d) (renumbered without change
in text)).
52. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8605 (McKinney 1987). Rent control was en-
acted to address an acute shortage in dwellings that resulted in "speculative"
and "abnormal" rent increases. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 787 (quoting N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8581 (McKinney 1987)). Sec-
tion 2204.6(d) was enacted pursuant to legislative recognition that evictions
would also have to be controlled. Id. at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at
787.
53. The term "named tenant" is used throughout this Note to refer to the
tenant whose name appears on the lease.
54. "No occupant of housing accommodations shall be evicted ... where
the occupant is either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other
member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant." 9
New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 2204.6(d), N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
(McKinney 1987).
55. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 217, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
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type of relationship with the deceased tenant brings the surviving occu-
pant of a rent-controlled apartment within the scope of the regulation's
protection. 5 6
Prior to 1980 New York courts adhered to a traditional view of fam-
ily in deciding disputes concerning occupancy rights to rent-controlled
or rent-stabilized apartments. 57 In line with the notion that family con-
sists of those related by blood, marriage or adoption, various lower
courts have held that co-occupants of a named tenant such as a god-
son 58 and a fiancee 5 9 were not members of tenants' immediate families.
In at least two cases, however, tenants' sisters, as blood relatives, quali-
fied as immediate family. 60
56. See, e.g., Herzog v. Joy, 74 A.D.2d 372, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1980) (sister of
named tenant protected from eviction from rent-controlled apartment), aff'd, 53
N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981); Raynes Assocs. v.
Augresani, 141 Misc. 2d 127, 536 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (named tenant's
homosexual lover not person within protection of § 2204.6(d)); Koppelman v.
O'Keeffe, 140 Misc. 2d 828, 535 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (gay life partner
of deceased tenant not surviving spouse or family member entitled to protection
under § 2204.6(d)). For a discussion of the economic incentives for such litiga-
tion, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
57. New York State's rent stabilization law, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAw §§ 8621-
8634 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1990), and the New York City regulations
promulgated pursuant to that statute are similar to, but less restrictive of land-
lords' rights, than the rent control statute and regulations. One similarity is that
both guarantee rights of occupancy of controlled or stabilized apartments to cer-
tain specified parties upon the death or voluntary vacation from the apartment
of a named tenant. See 9 New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations
§ 2204.6(d), N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAw (McKinney 1987) (rent control regulation); 9
New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations §§ 2523.5, 2520.6(o), N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAw (McKinney 1987) (rent stabilization regulations) (tenant's "family
member" has right to renewal or vacancy lease where tenant died or vacated
apartment; "family member" defined as "husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson,
stepdaughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew,
niece, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-
in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law" of tenant).
Under the rent control system, upon the death or voluntary vacation of the
tenant of record of a rent-controlled apartment, the apartment becomes decon-
trolled and is subject to the less restrictive, and for the landlord, more profita-
ble, system of rent stabilization. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 216-17, 543 N.E.2d at 57,
544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons,J., dissenting). An exception to decontrol is made
if there is a surviving member of the named tenant's family entitled to protection
from eviction and a new statutory rent-controlled tenancy under § 2204.6(d).
Id. at 217, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons, J., dissenting).
58. See Mideast Holding Corp. v. Tow, 60 Misc. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 706
(Civ. Ct. 1969) (landlord entitled to final judgment of possession where tenant's
adult godson occupied apartment in violation of lease provision limiting occu-
pancy to members of tenant's "immediate family").
59. See Fraydun Enters. v. Ettinger, 91 Misc. 2d 119, 397 N.Y.S.2d 301
(App. Term. 1977) (tenant's fiancee not member of tenant's family for purposes
of lease provision limiting occupancy to members of tenant's "immediate
family").
60. See Herzog v. Joy, 74 A.D.2d 372, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1980) (sister of
named tenant entitled to possession of rent-controlled apartment by virtue of
relationship to, and contemporaneous occupancy of apartment with, named ten-
372 [Vol. 35: p. 361
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The decision of the New York Civil Court in Zimmerman v. Burton6 1
in 1980 was the first indication of a shift away from strict judicial inter-
pretation of the definition of family. The court awarded possession of a
rent-controlled apartment to the surviving male partner of a cohabiting,
heterosexual couple, 62 placing the relationship under the protection of
section 2204.6(d) of the Rent and Eviction Regulations. 63 The court
analogized the relationship to a traditional marriage, rather than at-
tempting to characterize the surviving partner as family. 64 Thus, the
surviving heterosexual partner was apparently accorded protection
under the statute as the surviving spouse.
The Zimmerman opinion is, nevertheless, noteworthy in three re-
spects. First, the court relied on equitable considerations in awarding
occupancy to the surviving partner, rather than on strict judicial con-
struction of the language of the statute.6 5 Second, the court invoked the
concept of discrimination in discussing the emerging legal recognition
of the rights of unmarried partners. 66 Third, the court recognized a ne-
cessity for a case-by-case scrutiny of the non-traditional family and at-
tempted to set out a standard for determining whether such a
ant), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981); Bendes v.
Albert, 108 Misc. 2d 955, 439 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (tenant's sister, as
"direct blood relation," member of tenant's immediate family for purpose of
occupancy under rent-controlled lease).
61. 107 Misc. 2d 401, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
62. Id. at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
63. For the text of § 2204.6(d), see supra note 54.
64. Zimmerman, 107 Misc. 2d at 402, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 128. The court stated
that "[t]he issue presented is whether [§ 2204.6(d)] also protects those who co-
habited with the deceased tenant for a significant period of time in a partnership
closely akin to marriage." Id. The court went on to note that "[t]he rationale
for [§ 2204.6(d)] does not permit a distinction to be made between a bereaved
respondent and a widower with a marriage certificate." Id. at 403, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 129 (quoting Rutar Co. v. Gensuke Yoshito, No. 53042/79 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1979)).
65. Id. at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The court stated that "[t]he quality of
[the surviving partner's] relationship with [the deceased tenant], and the quan-
tity of time they spent together in a close and loving relationship is such that it
would be unfair and discriminatory to evict him because he lacks a marriage li-
cense." Id. (emphasis added). The court also noted that upon moving into the
rent-controlled apartment, the surviving partner assumed financial responsibil-
ity for the deceased tenant, and upon her death paid for her funeral services and
burial. Id. at 402, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
66. Id. at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The court opined that "[t]he law must
keep abreast of changing moral standards .... 'A prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on marital status is consistent with both evolving notions of morality
and the realities of contemporary urban society, where couples openly live in
heterosexual and homosexual units without sanction of State or clergy.' " Id. at
403, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 128 (quoting Hudson View Props. v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d
251, 256-57, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (Civ. Ct. 1980), rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 450
N.E.2d 234, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983) (reversed on ground that tenant had not
been discriminated against on basis of marital status)).
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relationship qualifies for protection under section 2204.6(d).6 7 Interest-
ingly, the court suggested that an appropriate standard would be similar
to that used by states which recognize common-law marriages. 68 Such a
standard would include two factors: (1) the presence of mutual consent
to act as husband and wife in an exclusive and permanent arrangement,
and (2) constant cohabitation for a significant period of time.69
In 420 East 80th Co. v. Chin70 the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Term, adopted an equitable approach similar to that used in Zimmer-
man. The court rejected a landlord's petition to evict a named tenant
and his live-in male lover for breach of their lease's occupancy clause.
7
'
The court decided that a lease clause limiting occupancy to "immediate
family" would not be enforced absent a showing of demonstrable preju-
dice to the landlord, violation of legal occupancy laws or waste to prop-
erty. 72 The court reasoned that "[iun the housing field, these are not
ordinary times and 'strict adherence to technical concepts of landlord
and tenant law' which might have justified eviction in the past is now to
be avoided." 7 3 The court declined to "conjur[e] up artificial dis-
tinctions among various types of sexual, fraternal, and economic
relationships. "
74
Two Associates v. Brown,75 a 1986 case, gave the Supreme Court of
New York County an opportunity to address the issue of discrimination
based on marital status raised in Zimmerman. The defendant, the surviv-
67. Id. at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
68. Id.
69. Id. The application of such a standard, however, has been criticized in
view of the fact that New York has not recognized the formation of common-law
marriages within the state since 1933. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 11 (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 1989) (marriage must be solemnized by clergyman, public official
or judge); see also Lepow v. Gress (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1984, at 14,
col. 1 ("To confer property rights upon [a cohabiting, heterosexual partner] as a
'surviving spouse' . . . would be contrary to the Legislature's abolition of com-
mon-law marriage in 1933.").
70. 115 Misc. 2d 195, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Term 1982), aft'd, 97 A.D.2d
390, 468 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1983).
71. Id. at 197, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 196-97, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (citation omitted). The court sup-
ported its reasoning with the recent judicial decision in In re Adult Anonymous
II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982) (upholding adoption of 43-year-old
man by his 32-year-old gay life partner). The Adult Anonymous H court stated that
[t]he "nuclear family" arrangement is no longer the only model of fam-
ily life in America. The realities of present day urban life allow for
many different types of non-traditional families .... In any event, the
best description of a family is a continuing relationship of love and
care, and an assumption of responsibility for some other person.
Id. at 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
74. 420 East 80th Co., 115 Misc. 2d at 197, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
75. 131 Misc. 2d 986, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 127 A.D.2d
173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1987) (reversed on grounds that regulation applied by
lower court not validly promulgated).
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ing gay life partner of the named tenant of a rent-stabilized apartment,
sought renewal of his partner's lease. 76 He argued that their relation-
ship was equivalent to a marriage and as the surviving spouse, he quali-
fied for a lease renewal as an "immediate family member."'7 7 He further
argued that failure to recognize him as the equivalent of a surviving
spouse would deny him equal protection of the law as guaranteed under
the United States and New York State Constitutions.7 8 While the court
rejected the defendant's claim to the classification of surviving spouse,79
76. Id. at 987, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
77. Id. at 988, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 606. The controlling law in this case was
Emergency Operational Bulletin No. 85-1, issued by the State Division of Hous-
ing and Community Renewal in response to a decision handed down by the New
York State Court of Appeals in Sullivan v. Brevard Associates, 66 N.Y.2d 489,
488 N.E.2d 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1985). The court in Sullivan held that due to
the absence of a definition of "tenant" in the Rent Stabilization Law and Code of
the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, a landlord was required to
offer a renewal lease of a rent-stabilized apartment only to the tenant named in
the original lease. Sullivan, 66 N.Y.2d at 491, 488 N.E.2d at 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d
at 96.
The Emergency Operational Bulletin defined "tenant" and also attempted
to modify the harsh effect of the Sullivan decision by requiring that landlords of
rent-stabilized apartments offer renewal leases to a named tenant's "immediate
family" (defined as a spouse, child or parent) upon his or her death or vacancy of
the apartment. Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 987, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 605. "Non-
immediate" family members (defined as a brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle,
aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law) were
entitled to vacancy leases (the right to first refusal of a new lease). Id. at 987-88,
502 N.Y.S.2d at 605. The trial court's decision in favor of the surviving partner
of the named tenant in Two Associates was appealed on the ground that the Oper-
ational Bulletin was invalidly promulgated. Two Assocs. v. Brown, 127 A.D.2d
173, 180, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966, 970 (1987). The Appellate Division agreed and
reversed the trial court's decision on that basis. Id. at 185, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
Thus, once again, the holding in Sullivan was controlling, restricting a landlord's
obligation of offering a renewal lease to the named tenant.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No state shall deprive] any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11
("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state .... ").
Both clauses guarantee that similar individuals will be treated in a similar man-
ner by the government where there is no basis for separate classification. See
NOWACK, supra note 38, at 525; see also Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 990, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 607.
When applying equal protection analysis, courts use the same standards of
review as employed in substantive due process analysis. See NOWACK, supra note
38, at 351, 524. For a discussion of substantive due process analysis and judicial
standards of review, see supra note 38. Equal protection and substantive due
process analyses are similar in that both require a court to review the substance
of a law. See NOWACK, supra note 38, at 351. Substantive due process analysis
focuses upon the adequacy of governmental justification for a law which restricts
the freedom of all persons in society. Id. at 350. In equal protection analysis,
however, the court is required to review the basis upon which the government
determined that certain classifications would receive the benefit of a law, while
others would not. Id.
79. Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 989, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 606. The court indi-
cated that two factors prevented the defendant from prevailing on this argu-
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it accepted his claim of equal protection. 80 The court reasoned that
[t]o interpret the [applicable regulation] so as not to include
the defendant as a family member would render it unconstitu-
tional in that there is no rational reason to exclude persons in
[the defendant's] situation from being classified as a family
member, when in fact, the relationship was much closer than
that of most family members.8 1
The court found that the defendant was a family member for the pur-
pose of entitlement to a vacancy lease.8 2 The court based its reasoning
on the arbitrariness of defining family solely by a list of eligible lineal
relationships without regard to any emotional or economic relationship
or dependency. 83
In 2-4 Realty Associates v. Pittman8 4 the New York Civil Court also
extended non-eviction rights to persons outside the "immediate family"
of the deceased tenant. 8 5 The court applied a substantive due process
ment. The first was the New York Court of Appeals' decision, In re Adoption of
Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984), which
rejected an attempt by a same-sex couple to create an immediate family relation-
ship through the process of adoption. Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 989, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 606. The second was the provision of New York's Domestic Rela-
tions Law prohibiting non-ceremonial or common-law marriages. Id. (citing
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1988)). The court found that giving the
defendant marital status would impose substantial legal and financial obligations
which were not contemplated by the defendant in this case. Id.
80. Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 989-90, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 606-07.
81. Id. at 990, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
82. Id. Despite its conclusion that the defendant's relationship to the
named tenant was closer than that of most family members, the court awarded
him only a vacancy lease. Under the Emergency Operational Bulletin, vacancy
leases, which involve a potential rent increase, rather than the more valuable
renewal leases are awarded to non-immediate family members. Id. For a discus-
sion of the Emergency Operational Bulletin, see supra note 77.
83. Two Assocs., 131 Misc. 2d at 990, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 607. The court rea-
soned that
[i]n the operational Bulletin at issue a host of relatives who are living in
the household are deemed to be family members and are given vacancy
lease rights whether or not there is a loving relationship among them or
whether indeed there exists any economic relationship or dependency.
To deem such collateral relatives, some of whom have no blood rela-
tionship to each other, family members and to deprive the instant de-
fendant, who has provided care and love through both a serious illness
and death, of family member status would indeed be an arbitrary way to
define family.
Id.
84. 137 Misc. 2d 898, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
85. Id. at 908, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 13. This case involved a claim of protection
from eviction under § 2204.6(d) of a woman and her son, who lived with and
cared for the named tenant for 25 years in a "family unit." Id. at 899-902, 523
N.Y.S.2d at 7-9. The court refused to restrict the statutory protection against
eviction to family members related solely by blood or marriage. Id. at 907-08,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13.
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analysis to section 2204.6(d). 8 6 The court's analysis relied heavily on
the recent case of McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,8 7 which had struck
down, as violating the due process protection of the New York State
Constitution, a zoning ordinance restricting occupancy in single-family
homes to those related by blood, marriage or adoption. 8 8 The McMinn
court applied a two-pronged rational relationship test to determine the
validity of the zoning ordinance under the due process clause. 89 While
the zoning ordinance was found to serve valid governmental pur-
poses,90 limitation of occupancy of homes to those related by blood,
marriage or adoption was held not to be a rational means of serving
those purposes. 9 1
The Pittman court found the reasoning of the McMinn court applica-
ble to the case before it because the zoning ordinance construed in Mc-
Minn and the rent control regulation (section 2204.6(d)) before the
court in Pittman served the same legitimate governmental purpose of
preserving the quality of communities or neighborhoods. 92 Addition-
ally, section 2204.6(d) serves the legitimate governmental purpose of
preservation of family units. 9 3 The Pittman court concluded that re-
stricting protection from eviction under section 2204.6(d) to family
members related solely by blood or marriage would not be a rational
means to achieve these purposes.94
86. Id. at 905-07, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 11-13. For a detailed discussion of the
doctrine of substantive due process, see supra note 38.
87. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
88. Id. at 551-52, 488 N.E.2d at 1244, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132. The suit was
brought by the McMinns, owners of a single-family home which they rented out
to four unrelated men, after criminal proceedings were brought against them
based on violations of the zoning ordinance. Id. at 548, 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 130.
89. Id. at 549-50, 488 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31. The two
prongs were: (1) the zoning ordinance must have been enacted in furtherance
of a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) there must be a reasonable rela-
tion between the end sought to be achieved by the ordinance and the means
used to achieve that end. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130-
31.
90. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131. The court cited
preservation of the character of traditional single-family neighborhoods, reduc-
tion of parking and traffic problems, prevention of noise and disturbance and
control of population density as some of the legitimate governmental purposes
served by the ordinance. Id.
91. Id. The court found that achievement of the government's purposes
depended "not upon the biological or legal relations between the occupants of a
house but generally upon the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number of
its occupants." Id.
92. Pittman, 137 Misc. 2d at 906, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
93. Id. at 907, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
94. Id. The court found that such an interpretation of § 2204.6(d) "would
be irrational and violative of the respondent's due process rights." Id. at 907,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13. The plaintiff's relationship with the deceased tenant,
although not a marital or blood relationship, was "precisely what the State and
17
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b. Braschi v. Stahl: The Court of Appeals Endorses an Expanded
Notion of Family
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. 95 the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with a fact pattern similar to that of Two Associates v. Brown.96 Bras-
chi arose when Stahl Associates Company threatened to evict Miguel
Braschi from the rent-controlled apartment, owned by Stahl, in which
Braschi was living.9 7 Braschi had shared the apartment with Leslie
Blanchard, the sole tenant of record, from 1975 until Blanchard's death
from AIDS in 1986.98 The two men regarded each other, and were re-
garded by family and friends, as spouses. 99 Soon after Blanchard's
death, Stahl Associates served a notice to terminate on Braschi, inform-
ing him that if the apartment was not vacated within one month, Stahl
Associates would commence summary eviction proceedings. 10 0
Braschi initiated an action seeking protection from eviction under
section 2204.6(d) of the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations
as a member of Blanchard's family.' 0 1 Braschi then moved for a prelim-
inary injunction enjoining Stahl Associates from evicting him until a fi-
nal decision was rendered on the merits of his claim.1°2 The trial court
granted Braschi's motion for a preliminary injunction.' 0 3 The Appellate
Division reversed, concluding that protection from eviction under sec-
tion 2204.6(d) should be afforded only to "family members within tradi-
tional, legally recognized familial relationships."' 10 4
city in enacting th[is] regulation[] meant to define, value and encourage." Id. at
907, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
95. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
96. 131 Misc. 2d 986, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 127 A.D.2d
173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1987). For a discussion of Two Associates, see supra notes
75-83 and accompanying text.
97. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
98. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86.
99. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
100. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786. Blanchard died in
September 1986. In November, Stahl Associates served a notice to cure on
Braschi, contending that as Blanchard was the sole tenant of record, Braschi was
a mere licensee with no further right to occupy the apartment. Id. at 206, 543
N.E.2d at 50-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86. Braschi remained in the apartment
and in December was served with the notice to terminate. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d
at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
101. Id. Braschi sought a permanent injunction and a declaration of enti-
tlement to occupy the apartment. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Supreme Court found that the relationship between Braschi
and Blanchard "fulfill[ed] any definitional criteria of the term 'family,' " and
thus Braschi was protected from eviction under § 2204.6(d) until a final decision
could be reached on the merits of his claim. Id.
104. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 143 A.D.2d 44, 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562,
563 (1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). The
Appellate Division granted Braschi leave to appeal its denial of preliminary in-junctive relief to the Court of Appeals, certifying the following question of law:
"Was the order of this court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court,
378 [Vol. 35: p..361
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On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed in a plurality decision,
concluding that as a matter of law, protection from eviction under sec-
tion 2204.6(d) must be extended to relationships "having all of the nor-
mal familial characteristics."' 10 5 Braschi had presented sufficient
evidence of a family-like relationship to demonstrate a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of his claim to protection from eviction and was there-
fore entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.106
The plurality based its holding on the narrow ground of statutory
construction. After noting that the term "family" is not defined in the
rent control code, and that there is no specific mention of section
2204.6(d) in the legislative history of the code, the plurality turned its
attention to the legislative history underlying the rent control system as
a whole. 10 7
The plurality determined that underlying the rent control system
were two seemingly competing purposes: (1) the protection of individu-
als from sudden eviction from their homes upon the death or vacation of
the tenant of record, and (2) the gradual transition of rent-controlled
apartments to the less rigorous rent stabilization system.' 0 8 The plural-
ity reasoned that extending protection from eviction to members of
non-traditional families would serve both purposes. 10 9 Such an exten-
sion would protect family members who have regarded the rent-con-
trolled apartment as their home, regardless of any legal relationship to
the tenant- of record.' 10 It would also foster the transition of housing
from rent control to rent stabilization by limiting protection from evic-
tion to those who have a genuine family relationship with the tenant of
record as distinguished from mere roommates or distant relatives. "'1
The plurality determined that an objective examination of the rela-
roperly made?" Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 207, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at86.
105. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 214, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at
789, 790.
106. Id. Braschi had presented evidence of his social and financial interde-
pendency with Blanchard. The two men lived together in the apartment at issue
for 10 years. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790. They considered
each other, and held themselves out to family and friends, as spouses. Id. They
shared financial obligations including a household budget, and maintained joint
checking and savings accounts, joint credit cards and shared safe-deposit boxes.
Id. During his final illness, Blanchard executed a power of attorney in Braschi's
favor so that Braschi could make all necessary financial, medical and personal
decisions for Blanchard. Id. In addition, Blanchard named Braschi as the bene-
ficiary of Blanchard's life insurance policy and as primary legatee and co-execu-
tor of Blanchard's estate. Id.
107. Id. at 208-09, 543 N.E.2d at 52-53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88.
108. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789. For a discussion of
the transition of rent-controlled apartments to the rent stabilization system, see
supra note 57.
109. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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tionship of the parties should be made when judging whether a particu-
lar individual is entitled to noneviction protection. 1 2 The court
pointed to a number of factors previously utilized by lower courts in
making this assessment: the exclusivity and longevity of the relation-
ship; the extent of emotional and financial interdependency; the manner
in which the couple conducted their daily lives and held themselves out
to society; and the reliance placed by each partner on the other for daily
family services.' 13
Judge Simons, writing in dissent for himself and Judge Hancock,
disagreed with the expansion of the definition of family beyond the
traditional legal relationships established by blood, marriage or adop-
tion. 114 Judge Simons agreed with the plurality regarding the purposes
underlying the rent control code.' 15 The dissent, however, urged the
application of a balancing test, which required the weighing of the inter-
ests of the individuals residing with the named tenant in protection from
eviction and those of the landlord of the rent-controlled apartment in
regaining possession of the apartment and re-renting it under the less
restrictive rent stabilization laws.' ° Judge Simons asserted that these
interests are properly balanced if protection from eviction is restricted
to those individuals having objectively verifiable relationships based on
the traditional, legally recognized bonds of blood, marriage or
adoption. 117
Judge Simons pointed out that his interpretation of the meaning of
family as used in the regulation promotes certainty and consistency in
the law and avoids the problems of a case-by-case determination of fam-
ily member status." 8 He also suggested that the fact that Braschi was
112. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
113. Id. at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The plurality
stated further that although these factors were helpful, "it is the totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the par-
ties which should, in the final analysis, control." Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55,
544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
114. Id. at 217, 543 N.E.2d at 57-58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 218, 543 N.E.2d at 58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Simons, J., dissenting). Judge Simons argued that such a distinc-
tion is just because members of families, as defined by blood, marriage or adop-
tion, assume legal obligations to one another and to third parties, which are not
imposed on unrelated individuals, and that this legal interdependency should be
considered when determining the scope of protection from eviction under
§ 2204.6(d). Id. (Simons,J., dissenting). Judge Simons also noted that this defi-
nition of family is used by the state in estate succession laws, family court acts
and similar legislation. Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
380 [Vol. 35: p. 361
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unable to avail himself of the institutions of marriage 19 or adoption12 0
as a means to establish a relationship eligible for protection under sec-
tion 2204.6(d) points out the need for a legislative, rather than a judi-
cial, solution.121
Judge Bellacosa, in a concurring opinion, approved of the result
reached by the plurality, but disagreed with the scope of both the plural-
ity and dissenting opinions. 122 In Judge Bellacosa's view, the court
needed only to apply section 2204.6(d) to the facts of the instant
case. 123 Any sweeping definition of the term "family" was both unnec-
essary and beyond the power of the court. 12 4
III. ANALYSIS
Although Braschi has been hailed as a significant legal victory for
same-sex couples, 12 5 this Note suggests that the case is likely to have
limited and unpredictable precedential effect, both in New York courts
and nationally. The Braschi plurality was careful to establish a narrow
context in which same-sex couples can be considered "family," empha-
sizing that its definition of that term was fashioned to further the legisla-
tive purposes underlying section 2204.6(d). 126 A decision based on
such narrow grounds is clearly limited in precedential value for cases
outside the context of eviction protection.12 7
119. For a discussion of the restriction of the rights of same-sex couples to
marry, see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the use of adoption by same-sex couples as a
means of establishing a legally recognized family relationship, see supra notes
15-18 and accompanying text.
121. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 219, 543 N.E.2d at 58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 793
(Simons, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring).
123. Id. (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
124. Id. (Bellacosa, J., concurring). Judge Bellacosa opined that the court
was not "empowered or expected to expand or to constrict the meaning of the
legislatively chosen word 'family,' which could have been and still can be quali-
fied or defined by the duly constituted enacting body in satisfying its separate
branch responsibility and prerogative." Id. (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
125. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
126. The plurality explicitly limited its analysis of a family relationship to
the context of eviction. "In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly
equally valid, view of family includes ....... Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543
N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89 (emphasis added). The court defined
family to include "two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term
and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdepen-
dence." Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789. The court reasoned
that "[t]his definition of 'family' is consistent with both of the competing pur-
oses of the rent-control laws." Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at
89. For the court's articulation of the purposes underlying § 2204.6(d), see
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
127. Braschi's likely precedential effect is further limited by its status as a
plurality, rather than a majority, opinion. Braschi was a four to two decision with
1990] NOTE
21
Gardner: Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado about Nothing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
382 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 361
The Braschi decision provides little support where a participant in a
same-sex relationship seeks the extension of a statutory right that is ex-
pressly limited to specifically defined categories of relationships. 1 28 Ac-
cording to the Braschi court's reasoning, a legislature makes its intent
clear as to the scope of such a statute's protection by expressly designat-
ing the relationships covered.' 2 9 Where the designated relationships
are unambiguously defined,judicial construction of such terms would be
outside of a court's authority.'
3 0
Additionally, the outcome of even a factually similar case arising
under section 2204.6(d) is uncertain after Braschi due to the plurality's
lack of guidance as to how its analysis is to be applied.' 3 1 Although the
one judge concurring in result only. Chief Judge Wachtler took no part in the
decision. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 223, 543 N.E.2d at 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
128. An example of such a statutorily created right is a cause of action for
wrongful death. Some state wrongful death statutes designate the relationships
qualifying for the statute's protection using terms such as "spouse" or "child"
which, unlike family, have unambiguous legal meanings. See, e.g., Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1988) (only deceased's spouse, children, father or
mother, or if no eligible person in those categories, brother or sister of deceased
or their descendants may recover under state's wrongful death statute); 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8301(b) (Purdon 1982) (only spouse, children or parents of
deceased person permitted to recover under state's wrongful death statute).
129. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The
court stated that "where a problem as to the meaning of a given term arises, a
court's role is not to delve into the minds of legislators, but rather to effectuate
the statute by carrying out the purpose of the statute as it is embodied in the words
chosen by the Legislature." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-40 (1947)). The Braschi
plurality decided that in construing § 2204.6(d) it was "reasonable to conclude
that, in using the term 'family,' the Legislature intended to extend protection to
those who reside in households having all of the normal familial characteristics."
Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
130. The doctrine of separation of powers limits the power of a court when
construing statutory language. As Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter pointed
out, "judges are expected to refrain from legislating in construing statutes," be-
cause "[i]n a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come
from, those popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as
courts are not." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 535, 545 (1947).
131. There are other indications that future cases involving the status of
same-sex couples under § 2204.6(d) may be decided differently than Braschi.
The first indication is found in the stance ofJudge Bellacosa's concurring opin-
ion, which was expressly limited to the result reached under the facts of the
instant case. Judge Bellacosa explained the basis of his concurring opinion as
follows:
My vote to reverse and remit rests on a narrower view of what must
be decided in this case than the plurality and dissenting opinions deem
necessary.
The issue. is solely whether petitioner qualifies as a member of a
"family" .... The particular anti-eviction public policy enactment is
fulfilled by affording the remedial protection to this petitioner on the facts
advanced on this record ....
Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 55-56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790-91 (Bel-
lacosa, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a discussion of Judge Bellacosa's
22
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plurality concluded that a case-by-case approach to the determination of
family-member status is necessary, it failed to provide sufficient guide-
lines as to the future application of its analysis. Where, as here, a court
construes the definition of a statutory term, clear guidelines are needed
to promote consistency and certainty in the definition's application. The
plurality attempted to provide such guidelines by listing several factors
to be considered when analyzing a relationship for the determination of
family status.13 2 The court, however, provided little guidance as to how
the factors should be applied in factual situations other than those pres-
ent the instant case.'1 3 The plurality concluded that it is the "totality of
the relationship" which should control and that the presence or absence
of one or more of the listed factors should not be dispositive. I3 4 Thus,
Braschi failed to establish minimum standards which must be met before
a relationship qualifies as "family" under section 2204.6(d).
Had the plurality based its decision on constitutional grounds, the
decision would have had far greater impact.' 3 5 A ruling based on the
equal protection clause of either the United States Constitution or the
New York state constitution1 3 6 would have shifted the focus of the anal-
ysis away from the specific language of the statute. Under equal protec-
tion analysis, the statutory language becomes irrelevant if the plaintiff
proves that a same-sex relationship is equivalent to a statutorily pro-
tected relationship and that there is no rational basis for denying the
statute's protection to same-sex relationships.' 3 7 If the plaintiff suc-
concurring opinion, see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. The concur-
ring opinion, however, gave no indication of which facts Judge Bellacosa consid-
ered controlling, other than the length of Braschi's cohabitation with Blanchard.
Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 215, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring). The second indication is the abstention of Chief Judge Wachtler
from the Braschi decision. Id. at 223, 543 N.E.2d at 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa may well be the deciding votes in
future decisions.
132. For a discussion of the factors outlined by the court, see supra note 113
and accompanying text.
133. The only guidance provided by the court was contained in its state-
ment that "a court examining [the facts in Braschi] could reasonably conclude
that these men were much more than mere roommates." Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at
213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
134. Id.
135. Braschi's brief urged reliance on equal protection grounds. See Bras-
chi, 74 N.Y.2d at 202.
136. For the text of both clauses and a discussion of equal protection analy-
sis, see supra note 78.
137. The equal protection clauses of both the United States and the New
York Constitutions require "that similarly situated persons must be treated in
the same way where there is no rational reason for separate classification." Two
Assocs. v. Brown, 131 Misc. 2d 986, 990, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1986),
rev'd, 127 A.D.2d 173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1987) (reversed on grounds that regu-
lation construed by lower court was invalidly promulgated). For a discussion of
the application of equal protection analysis in Two Associates, see supra notes 80-
83 and accompanying text.
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ceeds in proving both points, a court may extend the statutory protec-
tion to same-sex relationships regardless of specific statutory language
to the contrary.138 If the court declines to extend the statutory protec-
tion under the present wording of the statute, it must declare the statute
constitutionally invalid. Any statute subsequently enacted to extend the
same benefit would have to be worded broadly enough to encompass
same-sex relationships.
In Braschi the statutorily protected relationship was "family." Bras-
chi proved a family relationship with the deceased tenant. Additionally,
the plurality implicitly discounted the need for objective certainty as to
the scope of the regulation's protection and so could have concluded
that there was no rational basis for denying such protection to Braschi.
Thus, a decision based upon equal protection grounds was possible and
would have provided precedent for future use by courts in determining
that there is no rational basis for denying other statutory rights to same-
sex couples. Therefore, a decision based upon equal protection analy-
sis, rather than statutory construction, would have provided greater sup-
port for future plaintiffs seeking statutory protection for same-sex
relationships in the judicial system. Such a decision may have had a fur-
ther impact-on the legislative process itself. Faced with the prospect of
invalidation of future legislation on equal protection grounds, legisla-
tures might have been influenced to consider extending the benefit of
such legislation to same-sex couples.
It is likely that the Braschi decision will lead to further litigation as
landlords of rent-controlled apartments and parties seeking protection
from eviction under section 2204.6(d) force the courts to determine the
minimum standards necessary to qualify as "family" under the Braschi
definition. 139 Due to the lack of guidance in the Braschi opinion it will be
138. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist
two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare [the statute] a nullity ... or
it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by
the exclusion."). In such a case, the court is engaging in a "saving construction"
of the statute. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1036-37 (2d ed.
1988). Courts will generally construe a statute in such a way as to avoid invali-
dating it on constitutional grounds. See id. at 72 n.21 (citing Ashwander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
139. Such litigation appears likely in view of the economic incentives to liti-
gate. Landlords have a strong economic incentive for wanting to regain posses-
sion of a rent-controlled apartment. Upon the termination of a rent-controlled
tenancy, if there is no qualified successor to the tenancy under § 2204.6(d), the
rent control ends and the apartment becomes subject to rent stabilization. Bras-
chi, 74 N.Y.2d at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787. Under rent stabili-
zation, a landlord has greater control over the regulated premises, including the
amount of rent to be charged. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
Residents of rent-controlled apartments have strong economic incentive to
litigate as well. The rent control system imposes strict limits on'the amount of
rent to be charged for a controlled apartment. Id. at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 787. Additionally, affordable, available apartments are virtually
384 [Vol. 35: p. 361
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difficult for either party to accurately assess his chances of success.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
The difficulties encountered by the Braschi court in formulating a
workable analysis of a "family" relationship are not surprising due to the
subjective, intangible and unquantifiable qualities of such a relation-
ship.' 40 It is submitted that a consistent standard for case-by-case analy-
sis of relationships to determine family status under section 2204.6(d) is
not possible due to the nature of the family relationship. 14 1 Even if a
case-by-case analysis capable of being consistently applied could be de-
veloped, such an approach would lack the objective certainty that is the
main advantage of the traditional formulation of family (those related by
blood, marriage or adoption). As pointed out by Judge Simons' dissent,
such certainty is desirable to protect both the interest of the landlord in
regaining possession of a rent-controlled apartment and the apartment
dweller's interest in protection from eviction.1 42 Certainty is also
needed to prevent an undue burden on the courts from the excessive
litigation likely to result from Braschi.14 3
The formation of a definition of family for the purposes of protec-
tion from eviction is best left to the Division of Housing and Community
Renewal ("DHCR"), the New York City agency charged by the state leg-
islature with implementing New York City's rent control system. 144
DHCR promulgates the rent control regulations, including section
2204.6(d). 14 5
One possible approach available to DHCR is the establishment of a
"domestic partnership" registration system. 14 6 Under such a system,
nonexistent in New York City at this time. See Note, All in the Family: Succession
Rights and Rent-Stabilized Apartments, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 213, 213 (1987) (unof-
ficial vacancy rate for N.Y.C. apartments estimated to be minus one percent).
140. These difficulties are furthered by the Supreme Court's inability or
unwillingness to fashion a conclusive and comprehensive definition of "family."
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
141. It is further suggested that it is inherently unfair to force members of
same-sex couples to reveal intimate details of their private lives in court to prove
the close family relationship which is presumed to exist between married
couples.
142. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 218, 543 N.E.2d at 58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 793
(Simons, J., dissenting).
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 219, 543 N.E.2d at 59, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 794. The
powers of the DHCR are set forth at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8584 (McKinney
1987).
145. See 9 New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 2100.1, N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAw (McKinney 1987).
146. A similar domestic partnership registration system was implemented
by the City of Berkeley, California, although for a different purpose. For a dis-
cussion of Berkeley's domestic partnership ordinance, see supra note 10.
Although Berkeley's system has not met with much success, there is a crucial
difference involved in a registration system for rent control purposes. The City
1990] NOTE 385
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named tenants of rent-controlled apartments and their cohabiting part-
ners would be required to file an affidavit with the agency in order to
qualify the cohabiting partner for protection from eviction under section
2204.6(d). The affidavit would set forth the cohabiting couple's state-
ment that they satisfy the requirements of emotional and financial inter-
dependency as set forth in Braschi.'4 7 The cohabiting partner would
then automatically come under the protection of section 2204.6(d) with
no need for a judicial determination of the status of the relationship.
The landlord would necessarily be able to challenge the nature of the
relationship as set forth in the affidavit. 14 8 Such a challenge would pref-
erably begin with an administrative hearing held by the DHCR, rather
than in a judicial setting. The outlined registration system would thus
minimize both the cost and delay involved in a judicial proceeding and
free the court from an undue burden of cases.
The proposed approach to determination of family member status
under section 2204.6(d) would retain the flexibility of the case-by-case
approach utilized by the plurality in Braschi. Additionally, it would intro-
duce an element of certainty into the process without having to restrict
family member status to those related through blood, marriage or
adoption. ' 49
Mary F. Gardner
of Berkeley was unable to force the city's insurance carriers to comply with the
city policy of providing benefits to domestic partners. In contrast, landlords of
rent-controlled apartments are subject to the regulation of DHCR, which may
force compliance with a registration system. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§ 8584.5(a) (McKinney 1987).
147. For a discussion of these requirements, see supra note 113 and accom-
panying text. Such an affidavit could be kept confidential, thus preventing the
problem of disclosure of intimate details of couples' private lives necessary in a
court determination of family status.
148. Without such a procedure for challenge by the landlord, a registration
system such as the one described would enable tenants to create succession
rights to a tenancy virtually at will.
149. In apparent response to the decision in Braschi, the DHCR promul-
gated the Emergency/Proposed Permanent Amendments to the New York State
Rent Regulations on Succession Rights of Family Members Residing With Rent
Stabilized and Rent Controlled Tenants, N.Y. St. Reg., Nov. 29, 1989, at 23-29.
The proposed amendment to § 2204.6(d) defines "family member" as
a husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother,
stepfather, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter,
father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law of the ten-
ant; or any other person residing with the tenant ... who can prove emo-
tional and financial commitment, and interdependence between such
person and the tenant.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
The proposed amendment lists factors to be considered in determining
whether the required emotional and financial commitment and interdependence
existed between the tenant and the claimant. Id. The listed factors are similar to
those outlined in Braschi and include the longevity of the relationship, sharing of
expenses and intermingling of finances, engaging in family-type activities and
26
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performing family functions, formalizing legal obligations and intentions toward
each other through documents such as wills or personal relationship contracts
and holding themselves out as family members to family, friends and society. Id.
The proposed amendment provides somewhat greater guidance for the determi-
nation of family member status than did Braschi by virtue of a longer and more
detailed list of factors to be considered. Like Braschi, however, it fails to set forth
the minimum standards which must be met before achieving family member sta-
tus. The proposed amendment does provide for an optional notice from the
tenant to the landlord that a family member is eligible for § 2204.6(d)'s protec-
tion. The landlord, however, is provided with no administrative avenue to chal-
lenge the claimed eligibility. Thus, due to the lack of minimum standards for
family member status and the absence of an administrative channel for chal-
lenges to such status, the proposed amended regulation leads to the same
problems as the Braschi decision: a need for objective certainty as to the pro-
tected parties and the likelihood of increased litigation. The registration system
proposed in this Note would, as noted above, alleviate these problems. For a
discussion of the proposed registration system, see supra notes 146-49 and ac-
companying text.
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